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The purpose of this thesis is to find some rational
justification for the existence of the Supreme Court
and its power of judicial review within a democratic
framework of government.

The avenue I take to complete

this task involves two aspects:

(1) questioning the

validity of American democracy, and (2) examining the
effectiveness of various influences or restraints on
the power of the Court.
My conclusions are somewhat mixed.

First of all,

I feel it more accurate to refer to American government
not as a democracy but as a constitutional democracy.
In that respect, we are a government with limited power.
Secondly, there are various influences or restraints
on the power of the Court that exist within the Consti
tution and outside of it.

Historically, on several

occasions, the Court's power has been curtailed by any
one of these influences or restraints.

However, we

might add that the failures to restrain the Court do
far outweigh the successes.
a government by judiciary?

Does this imply we are
I say not.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Statement of the Problem
Substantive Problem
In Federalist No. 78, Alexander Hamilton argued
that the United States Supreme Court would be the weakest
of the three branches of government.

However, in 1962,

Alexander Bickel wrote that "the least dangerous branch
of American government had become the most extra
ordinarily powerful court of law the world had ever
known" (Bickel, 1986, p. 1).

It is this enormous growth

of judicial power that places the Supreme Court in the
midst of American political controversy.
What explains this enormous growth in judicial
power?

Obviously, it can be attributed to the Court's

power of judicial review which the Court assumed for
itself in the Marbury vs. Madison decision in 1803.
With this power of judicial review, the Court places
itself in a rather unusual circumstance within America's
constitutional framework of government.

As defined,

judicial review gives the Court the authority to review
the constitutionality of legislative and executive acts
1
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(Fisher, 1990, p. A-21).

If, as asserted by Chief

Justice John Marshall, there is a conflict between the
Constitution and ordinary law, it will be the job of
the courts to resolve the conflict and to do so by giving
effect to the supremacy of the Constitution (Barnum,
1993, p. 252).

In this respect, the Supreme Court,

with its power of judicial review, becomes a ''quasi
guardian" to the American Constitution.
Why is this so controversial?

The fact remains

that the Supreme Court is neither elected nor accountable
to the American people.

Article II of the Constitution

specifically states that Supreme Court justices shall
be nominated by the president with the advice and consent
of the Senate.

Likewise, the Court's very own power

of judicial review is nowhere explicitly stated in the
Constitution.

Yet, at the same time, the Court engages

in what can be referred to as policy-making.
Howard Ball, in his book, COURTS AND POLITICS,
refers to this unusual situation as simply a "paradox
of judicial review" (Ball, 1987, p. 7).

The paradox

rests on the fact that ''the political system is demo
cratic, yet a nonelected, lifetime appointed set of
jurists are normatively and constitutionally committed
to preserving and maximizing the contours of the
democratic system" (p. 10).

He refers to the Supreme

Court as "an oligarchic institution functioning within
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the confines of a democratic environment" (p. 10).
Hence, the controversy is rather obvious.

We have

an inherently non-democratic institution, the Supreme
Court, holding the democratic institutions, the presi
dency and the Congress, accountable to the American
Constitution.
Research Problem
Without a doubt the Supreme Court is an integral
part of America's complex system of democratic self
government (Barnum, 1993, p. 312).

It fulfills an

essential governmental function by assuming primary
responsibility for enforcing the minority protection
features of the Constitution (p. 312).

At the same

time, however, the Court is constrained in a variety
of ways by the political environment in which it operates
(p. 312).

In that respect, I would argue that there

are several reasons to conclude that the Supreme Court
is not beyond majoritarian control and that its power
of judicial review is not necessarily inconsistent with
the fundamental ideals of a democracy (p. 312).
To this, I would also add that the very essence
of the Supreme Court's prestige rests upon the para
doxical nature of its judicial power.

With respect

to its power of judicial review, it is the primary
responsibility of the Court to hold government, both
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national and state, in conformity to the parameters
given in the Constitution.

When, however, the Court

goes beyond these given parameters, it not only
jeopardizes the very paradox on which its own power
rests, it also jeopardizes the very nature of our
democratic system of government.

The Supreme Court

holds an unsual position within America's democratic
system of government.

It must learn not to abuse that

position.
Review of the Literature
The literature in the field of judicial politics
ranges on a continuum from the more conservative to
the more liberal.

Those who advocate a more conservative

approach tend to favor a judiciary that is self
restrained politically and is more adept to interpret
the Constitution using its framers' original meaning.
Those who favor the liberal approach, however, tend
to want a judiciary more active in public policy and
one that is more inclined to view the Constitution as
a "living document."

Those between the two opposing

ideologies tend to want the best of both sides.

They

believe that the Court plays a fundamental role in
American society.

Yet, they fully understand the

implications of the Court's existence.

Their approach

tends to look for means to reconcile the Court and its
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power to a democratic framework of government.
Constitutional Conservative Approach
The primary basis of the conservative approach
is its emphasis on strict constructionism or on strict
interpretivism of the Constitution.

This viewpoint,

which is most clearly evidenced in the writings of both
Raoul Berger and Robert Bork, also attaches on the need
for the Court to be self-restrained and to be deferent
to the wishes of Congress.
Understandably, the conservative approach recognizes
the unusual position of the Court in an American demo
cratic framework of government.

The Court is not elected

nor is it accountable to the American people.

Its power

of review is nowhere explicitly stated in the Consti
tution but is merely based upon precedent.

As such,

conservatives believe that this should provide sound
reason for the Court to remain aloof of public policy
issues.

The Court, as Robert Bork asserts, should not

"begin to rule where a legislator should" (Bork,
p. 1).

1990,

The Court should abide by the principles con

tained in the Constitution and by the original intentions
of the framers to the Constitution.

It is not the duty

of the Court to legislate policy, nor is it the duty
of the Court to redefine the intentions of the framers.

6

The Reconcilable/Middle Approach
Those advocates that I would consider in the middle
along the spectrum of judicial politics tend to look
for means of reconciling the Supreme Court and its power
of judicial review to American democracy.

Their effort

begins by first acknowledging that the Court exists
and that it has, and does, play a major role in the
formation of American public policy.

For those, such

as Alexander Bickel, the ultimate objective is not to
attack the Supreme Court for its decisions but to somehow
justify them within the confines of the political
process.
Indeed, it must be remembered that "it would be
intolerable for the Court finally to govern all that
it touches, for that would turn us into a Platonic
kingdom contrary to the morality of self-government"
(Bickel, 1986, p. 200).

Certainly, the Court and

judicial review are beneficial to a democratic society.
For Bickel, the Court is the "best equipped" to serve
as a guardian of the people's values (p. 24).

In

essence, by the fact that the Supreme Court is not
accountable to the American people makes it the "most
suitable institution" to uphold the countermajoritarian
ideals of the Constitution (Barnum, 1993, p. 271).
As such, this, alone, makes the Court "fully entitled"
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to engage in judicial policy-making (p. 271).
Nevertheless, at the same time, it must also be
remembered that there are necessary limits on the Court's
power.

David Barnum asserts that these limits can be

easily found in the Constitution itself.

Undoubtedly,

"one of the essential purposes of the Constitution is
to place limits on governmental power and to protect
individual rights" (p. 271).
Constitutional Liberal Approach
The liberal approach places judicial activism as
its primary focal point.

Likewise, it tends to see

the Constitution as a flexible document--a "living
Constitution."
Advocates of the liberal approach, such as John
Agresto, believe that the Court should be able to use
its power more freely and without necessary selfrestraint.

As guardian of the countermajoritarian

provisions of the Constitution, it is the duty of the
Court to play an active role in policy formation.

Henry

Abraham asserts that these "activists believe in a more
affirmative, aggressive judicial policy" (Abraham, 1991,
p. 72).

As such, these "activists are more inclined"

to want the judiciary "to legislate, to prescribe policy"
(p.

72).
For liberal advocates such as John Agresto, this
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does not imply an advocation of government by judiciary
(Agresto, 1984, p. 11).

Of course, the Court should

be active, but the presidency and Congress should also
be active (p. 11).

The president and Congress should

play a more active role in issues of Constitutional
concern (p. 11).

Indeed, the judiciary checks both

the executive and legislative branches of government,
but who checks the judicial branch?

Agresto argues

that the president's and Congress's acceptance of as
well as their reliance on the Court's constitutional
decision-making is inherently dangerous (p. 11).

The

Court should not, by itself, become a generator of social
change (p. 11).

It should only be one component of

a mutually checked and balanced system of government.
Supporters of a more liberal stance for the
judiciary also tend to view the Constitution as a
"living" source of government.

These "nonoriginalists"

believe that the Constitution is not a fixed document-its meaning can be reinterpretted to apply to the
generation for which it currently exists.

Because of

the Constitution's very broad and general language,
these nonoriginalists believe that the framers intended
it to be that way.

Certainly, the framers could not

have foreseen the invention of wiretaps or surveillance
cameras when they incorporated the Fourth Amendment's
search and seizure clause into the Constitution.

As
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such, the Constitution must be viewed as an adaptable
creation of government--one that can be changed to fit
the environment under which it exists.
Hypothesis
I feel that the Supreme Court is an essential
component within America's democratic framework of
government.

While on its surface the Court appears

to be undemocratic, it does perform a vital role as
a protector and guardian of the Constitution (Barnum,
1993, pp. 311-312).

At the same time, the Court does

not hold a monopoly on government power.

It is still

part of the complex network of checks and balances that
our founding fathers created.

Obviously, the Court's

power can be "constrained [or checked] in a variety
of ways by the political environment in which it operates" (p. 313).

In that respect, I would have to argue

that the Court is not an inherent threat to the democratic principles on which our government is founded
(p. 312).

Indeed, there are an abundance of reasons

to conclude that the Supreme Court is not beyond the
control of the majority and that its power of judicial
review is not totally contradictory to the fundamental
principles of a democratic government (p. 312).
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Specification of the Underlying Design of the Research
The primary objective of this research is to examine
justifications for the Court's use of its judicial review
power within America's democracy.

In trying to consider

a supporting rationale, I will examine the various
"checks" on the Court's power.

David Barnum refers

to these various constraints on Court power as "formal"
and "informal."

By formal constraint, Barnum is refer-

ring to, for example, Congress's control over the Court's
appellate jurisdiction.

In regards to informal con-

straint, Barnum is speaking more to public opinion and
how it influences the Court.

Obviously, both types

of constraints represent a potential check on the Court's
power.

My objective is to examine the historical useful-

ness of each one of these checks on the Court.

Have

they historically been formidable tools to restrain
the Supreme Court's use of its judicial review power?
I will also examine the Supreme Court and its power
of judicial review in a democracy.

Indeed, the Supreme

Court is said to be an undemocratic institution operating
within the confines of a democratic framework of government.

David Barnun, however, questions the validity

of whether or not the United States is a democracy.
He argues that it would probably be more appropriate
to characterize the United States as a constitutional

11

democracy.

We are a nation built upon a document that

limits the power of government and protects the rights
of its citizens.
Constitution.

That document is the United States

In this respect, I would like to examine

this theory, as proposed by Barnum, that attempts to
justify a supreme court with a reviewing power within
a constitutional democracy.

As stipulated by Barnum,

the primary goal of this theory "is not to excuse or
downplay the Court's role in the political process,
but to establish that it is fully entitled to play an
active and at times a countermajoritarian role in the
policy-making process" (p. 271 ).

CHAPTER II
A HISTORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
Introduction
Justice Oliver

w.

Holmes once observed that the

Supreme Court was a "storm centre" in American political
controversy (O'Brien, 1990, p. 13).
has been.

Indeed, it certainly

From Dred Scott vs. Sandford to Brown vs.

Board of Education to Roe vs. Wade, the Supreme Court
has been, and is, a pinnacle of controversy in American
politics.

Ironically, Alexander Hamilton wrote that

the Supreme Court would be the weakest of the three
coordinate branches of government (Fisher, 1990, p.
59).

Certainly, history has shown otherwise.

At times,

the Supreme Court has proven itself to be an "extra
ordinarly powerful court of law'' (Bickel, 1986, p. 1).
For nearly fifty years, the Court was able to restrain
the government, both state and federal, from interfering
in what it considered as matters of economics (Schwartz,
1968, pp. 50-56).

In effect, by infusing a laissez-faire

orthodoxy into the Constitution, the Supreme Court was
able to prevent the government, at both levels, from
regulating American business.

At other times, the Court

has been able to place itself in a rather unusually
12
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preeminent position as a "guardian" of civil rights
and liberties as well as of criminal rights (pp. 70-80).
Without a doubt, the core of much of the controversy
encircling the Supreme Court is its unusual power of
judicial review.

Why is this power so unusual?

First,

there really is no clear specification of a power of
judicial review in the Judiciary Article of the Constitution--Article III.

And second, the fact that the

Supreme Court has used this power to assume for itself
a guardian role to the Constitution.

Of primary concern

here is the origination of judicial review and the role
it has played in American constitutional history.
Early Justifications of Judicial Review
Certainly, anyone who knows anything about American
judicial politics has come across the celebrated case
of Marbury vs. Madison (1803).

It, effectively, serves

as a legal precedent for the establishment of a power
of judicial review for the Supreme Court of the United
States.

However, it is not the first instance of the

concept of judicial review.

Historically, the roots

of judicial review go much further back in time.

Indeed,

a number of precedents prepared the way for Marbury
vs. Madison.
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The Dr. Bonham's Case
Undoubtedly, the most famous of the early references
to a judicial review power was Chief Justice Edward
Coke's opinion in the Dr. Bonham's Case of 1610.

Viewed

as an authority on English common law, Sir Edward Coke,
in his INSTITUTES, asserted that the Magna Charta as
well as common law "embodied certain fundamental principles of right and justice" (Kelly and Harbison, 1963,
p. 46).

As such, these principles of "natural law,"

he argued, gave the Magna Charta and common law a sense
of legal supremacy over both the king and Parliament
(pp. 46-47).

His dictum in the Dr. Bonham's Case embel-

lish much of this viewpoint (p. 46).
In 1610, while Sir Edward Coke was serving as chief
justice on the King's Bench, an opportunity arose which
called into question an act of Parliament.

This partic-

ular act empowered the London College of Physicians
to make mandatory the licensing of medical doctors within
the city.

The act also gave the College the power to

penalize physicians who continued to practice medicine
without this license.

Dr. Bonham was charged with having

violated this act.

However, Chief Justice Coke believed

otherwise (p. 46).

Coke released Dr. Bonham on the

grounds that the act of Parliament in question was void
(p. 46).

He said that when an act of Parliament "is
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against common right and reason, or repugnant, or
impossible to be performed, the common law will controul
it, and adjudge such act to be void" (Fisher, 1990,
p. 43).

Ironically, while in this case Chief Justice Coke
was very successful in setting a precedent, the idea
itself of a court being able to declare an act of
Parliament void never really took root on English soil
(p. 43).

Certainly, in later years, other English judges

would rely on Coke's dictum, but their usage of it
remained, for the most part, very limited (Agresto,
1984, p. 41).
The Writs of Assistance Case
Indeed, while Coke's argument may have gone
unnoticed in England, it certainly was not in prerevolutionary America.

In fact, throughout the

eighteenth century, Coke was considered the legal
authority to many a colonial lawyer in America (Kelly
and Harbison, 1963, p. 47).

His idea that natural law

carried preeminence over any act of Parliament was quite
appealing to Americans (p. 47).

Especially, in a time

when Great Britain was making concerted efforts to
reestablish its eminence over the American colony.
The first clear American application of Coke's
idea was the Writs of Assistance Case of Massachusetts
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in 1761.

Writs of assistance were authorized under

an act of Parliament in the year 1662.

The writs, for

the most part, were merely nothing more than search
warrants.

They gave English officials the authority

to search any premise at virtually any time - (p. 47).
The controversy over the writs of assistance
occurred when King George II died in 1760 (p. 47).
Since writs were issued in the king's name, this required
that they be renewed under the new king's name--King
George III.

However, at the time, several merchants

of Massachusetts were angered by England's recent
tightening of regulations over their commerical
activities (p. 47).

When English customs officials

in Massachusetts sought to apply for the new writs,
the disgruntled merchants decided to challenge them
in court.
Representing the merchants before the Superior
Court of Massachusetts was James Otis.

Using the Dr.

Bonham's Case as reference, Otis argued that the writs
of assistance were fundamentally illegal (p. 48).

As

such, they were against the very essence of common law
which protected the security of every man in his own
home (p. 48).

Since the writs were in violation of

common law, this implied that the very act of Parliament
itself authorizing the writs was also against common
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law (p. 48).

Common law being supreme, Otis asserted,

Thus reason and the constitution are both
against this writ • . . • No acts of
Parliament can establish such a writ;
though
it should be made in the very words of the
petition, it would be void. An act against
the Constitution is void (p. 48).
By declaring that Great Britain was ruled over by a
higher law, a common law, Otis, like Chief Justice Coke,
was making the assertion that Parliament was limited
by and subserviant to this supreme law (p. 48).

Any

act of Parliament in contradiction to this supreme law
was necessarily null and void (Fisher, 1990, p. 43).
While James Otis was unsuccessful in proving his
case before the Massachusetts Superior Court, his attempt
to do so would serve as a foundation for others to
continue onward.
Early State Court Decisions
By the time of the American Revolution, several
of America's courts had ruled that acts of Parliament
could be held void if they violated the fundamentals
of common law (p. 43).

However, it would take much

more than voiding acts of Parliament to assert that
American courts possess an inherent right to a judicial
review power over legislation (p. 43).

Between the

American Revolution and the drafting of the Constitution,
several state courts tried their hand at reviewing state
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legislation.

In most cases, the results of their actions

were less than promising.
One of the first cases to involve a sense of
judicial review was Rutgers vs. Waddington in 1784
(Agresto, 1984, p. 58).

The focus of the case was

primarily on a New York law which allowed an individual
to sue for damages those who had invaded his property
during a time of war (p. 58).

At issue was the right

of the state legislature to confiscate property (Tory)
even though such an action clearly violated the Treaty
of Peace negotiated between the United States and Great
Britain (Kelly and Harbison, 1963, p. 105).

In deciding

the case, the New York City Court diregarded the state
law (Agresto, 1984, p. 58).

It ruled that the statute

was in clear conflict with both "the international custom
of nations and the recent treaty with Great Britain"
(p. 58).

However, the results of its "judicial review"

were not all that impressive (p. 58).

Following the

decision, the New York State legislature voted to censure
the court for its actions (p. 58).
In 1786, another case arose which tested the
possibility of a court of law exercising a sense of
judicial review over state legislation.
Trevett vs. Weeden;
sive.

The case was

its results were equally unimpres-

At issue in this case was a Rhode Island law

which made it mandatory for individuals to accept paper
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money for payment in place of gold or silver (p. 56).
John Weeden, a butcher, had refused to accept paper
money for payment of his services.

Under Rhode Island

law, the penalty for such a violation was severe.
"Anyone accused of the crime was given only three days
to prepare for trial, no jury was allowed, no appeal
from a conviction was allowed, and the fine was fixed,
steeply, at 100 pounds" (p. 56).
The legal issue before the Superior Court of Rhode
Island was whether the Rhode Island legislature could
effectively deny an individual his right to a jury by
trial (p. 57).

In reaching its decision, the court

fell short of declaring the law as unconstitutional.
Instead, it merely ruled that it was "not cognizable"
(p. 57).

As such, Weeden's case was dismissed and he

was allowed to go free (p. 57).

The aftermath for the

court, however, was not quite so simple.

Determined

to prevent such an action from reoccuring, the state
legislature ordered the judges arrested to stand trial
on impeachment charges (p. 57).

They were later re-

leased, however, on the grounds that what they had done
could not necessarily be considered "criminal" (p. 57).
In any effect, the state legislature was still able
to have its revenge;

it merely refused to reappoint

the judges at the end of their term (p. 57).
Probably the clearest example of a court exercising
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a sense of judicial review power was the Bayard vs.
Singleton case of North Carolina in 1787 (Kelly and
Harbison, 1963, p. 99).

In this case, the Supreme Court

of North Carolina openly held a state law "unconstitutional and void" (Agresto, 1984, p. 59).

The state

law in question provided for the recovery of property
under an earlier Tory confiscation law (Kelly and
Harbison, 1963, p. 99).

The court ruled that the law

violated the constitutional guarantee that "every citizen
had undoubtedly a right to a decision of his property
by trial and by jury" (p. 99).

As with the other cases,

the judges in this case were, likewise, not immune to
legislative scrutiny and threat (p. 100).
These cases were certainly not the only ones in
which a court of law challenged a legislative statute
on the grounds of its constitutionality (p. 100).

In

most instances, in each case, like these, the judges
involved were put under the pressure of a protesting
legislative assembly (p. 100).

And, in most instances,

like these, the judges were made to pay the penalty
for their decisions.

Yet, even with all these set-backs,

the concept of judicial review survived.

In fact, after

1789, "the doctrine of judicial review itself would
pass into the new federal judiciary under the [new]
Constitution" (p. 100).

21
The Framers and Judicial Review
Many of the founding fathers were emphatic in their
belief that the United States should be based upon and
guided by a written constitution.

Fearful of concen-

trated power, they believed a written constitution would
place limits on the powers of government.

No govern-

mental institution and certainly no governmental official
would be all powerful.

Under a written constitution,

the powers of government would flow from the constitution
and would be subject to the limitations prescribed in
it.
Nevertheless, by 1787, their first attempt at such
an arrangement, the Articles of Confederation, was
proving itself to be an unworkable constitution.

Its

"league of friendship" format left states with virtually
"undepleted sovereignty" and the national government
with very little power (p. 103).

Under the Articles,

the United States was not one nation but, instead,
thirteen "sovereign, free, and independent" states (p.
103).

With little power, the national government often

found itself unable to resolve urgent issues in the
economy or in foreign policy (Gruver, 1985, pp. 147-155).
By 1787, the urgency of these problems prompted the
calling of a convention to recommend revisions to the
Articles of Confederation (p. 162).

However, the result
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of this convention would not be a revised Articles but
a completely new Constitution.
Of primary concern for many of the convention's
members was the belief that the United States needed
a stronger

national government.

Essentially, a national

government that would be "more effective at resolving
disputes among the states over legal and monetary issues"
(Fisher, 1990, p. 44).

Their viewpoint, in the end,

became Article VI of the Constitution.
The Constitution and the laws of the United
States which shall be made in pursuance
thereof shall be the supreme law of the
land; and the judges in every state shall
be bound thereby (U.S. Constitution, art.
6).
Emphatically, the supremacy clause placed the Constitution at the helm of the American political process.
Unlike the Articles of Confederation which enumerated only one supreme Congress, the new Constitution
would be composed of three co-equal branches of government--the executive, the legislative, and the judiciary
(Fisher, 1990, p. 44).

More respectfully, it would

be composed of the president, the Congress, and the
Supreme Court.

Article III of the Constitution would

create the Supreme Court; it would, likewise, give
to Congress the power to create lesser courts.
Article III, Section 1, of the Constitution states
that "the judicial power of the United States, shall
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be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior
courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain
and establish" (U.S. Constitution, art. 3, sec. 1).
It then goes on and effectively enumerates the extent
of judicial power the Supreme Court possesses.

For

instance, it can hear all cases affecting ambassadors
or cases involving a controversy between two or more
states.

Article III divides the Court's jurisdiction

into two arenas--original jurisdiction and appellate
jurisdiction.

Original jurisdiction allows the Court

to hear cases first while appellate jurisdiction allows
the court to review the judicial decision of a lower
court.

Article III, Section 2, specifically defines

the extent of the Court's original jurisdiction while
it leaves its appellate jurisdiction in the hands of
Congress.
The Convention and Judicial Review
Needless to say, a judicial power of review is
nowhere explicitly stated in the Judiciary Article.
Initially, the relationship between the Constitution
and other laws was generally believed to be unequal.
The framers assumed that it was possible for ordinary
law to fail to satisfy the requirements of the
Constitution.

As the supreme law of the land, the

Constitution would serve as the basis from which all
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other laws were created.

It, in essence, would serve

as the "blueprint" from which all functions of government
would originate.

Thus, in the supremacy clause, the

framers asserted that national laws, in order to join
the Constitution in the category described as the
"supreme law of the land," must be made in "pursuance"
of the Constitution (U.S. Constitution, art. 6).
Clearly, should any conflict arise between the
Constitution and ordinary law, the Constitution must
always prevail.
Within the Constitution, nevertheless, the language
was unclear as to which institution of government should
be empowered to resolve such alleged conflicts between
the Constitution and other laws.

By itself, the

Constitution was only a document--a simple piece of
paper.

To be an effective basis of government, it would

require an instrument of enforcement.

If it was to

be supreme to all other laws, then who would decide
the implications of its existence to those laws?
During the convention, the idea of a judicial review
power was discussed at great length as possibly being
a "check" on Congress and states (Fisher, 1990, p. 44).
The concern, however, over "contradictory state rulings
on matters of national concern" was largely dampened
with the incorporation of the supremacy clause into
Article VI of the Constitution (p. 44).

If conflict
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should arise between national law and state legislation,
the supremacy clause would necessarily hold that the
national law should prevail (p. 45).
But, of more far reaching concern to the framers
was the fear of national legislative power--in this
case, Congress.

Indeed, of the several debates over

judicial review, this one was probably the most important
(p. 44).

In Federalist No. 48, James Madison asserted

that the "legislative department is everywhere extending
the sphere of its activity and drawing all power into
its impetuous vortex" (p. 44).

Certainly, Madison was

not the only one concerned with this fear of overreaching
legislative power (p. 44).
Edmund Randolph devised a plan that he felt would
"check" the ambitions of legislative power.

His idea,

the Council of Revision, would pair the executive with
the judiciary against the legislature.
The executive and a convenient number of
the national judiciary • • • with authority
to examine every act of the national legislature before it shall operate, and every
act of a particular legislature before a
negative thereon shall be final;
and that
the dissent of the said council shall amount
to a rejection, unless the act of the national
legislature be again passed (p. 44).
In the end, his Council of Revision was eliminated from
the debates.
Indeed, other framers simply believed that the
judiciary possessed an inherent right to a power of

judicial review.

James Wilson asserted that the

legislature would be "kept within its prescribed bounds"
by a judicial review power (p. 45).

Oliver Ellsworth

believed that federal judges were clearly expected to
void legislation contrary to the parameters of the
Constitution (p. 45).

And, John Marshall believed that

the federal judiciary would declare as unconstitutional
any act of Congress lacking conformity to the
Constitution (p. 45).
Clearly, what can be accurately deduced from the
various debates over judicial review was the fact that
several of the delegates to the convention favored some
form of its existence (p. 44).

The question remains--why

wasn't it explicitly incorporated into the text of the
Constitution?
Alexander Hamilton and Federalist No. 78
For the most part, Federalist No. 78 deals directly
with the doctrine of judicial review (Agresto, 1984,
p. 64).

In it, Hamilton attempted to lay a foundation

for what he believed would be a defense of the federal
judiciary in using judicial review (Kelly and Harbison,
1963, p. 229).
Hamilton designed his defense of a judicial review
power primarily within the context of the check and
balance system promulgated in the Constitution (Agresto,
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1984, pp. 64-65).

In laying out his argument, Hamilton

acknowledged the apparent weaknesses of the judicial
branch (p. 64).

The federal judiciary, he asserted,

"may truly be said to have neither Force nor Will, but
merely judgment" (Fisher, 1990, p. 59).

In essence,

having "no influence over either the sword or the purse,"
"the judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will
always be the least dangerous" (p. 59).

To overcome

this apparent weakness, the judiciary would necessarily
need a defense against both the legislature and the
executive (Agresto, 1984, p. 64).

Its first defense

would be its sense of "permanency of office" (p. 64).
Its second defense would be its ability to review
legislation (p. 64).

In essence, "without the power

to disregard unconstitutional laws, there would be little
to prevent the erosion of what few powers the judicial
branch did itself in fact possess" (p. 65).
Hamilton, likewise, defended the power of judicial
review in terms of its merit to society (p. 65).

Here,

Hamilton argued that without judicial review, "all the
reservations of particular rights or privileges would
amount to nothing" (Fisher, 1990, p. 59).

A constitution

implies limits and those limits "can only be preserved
through the medium of judicial review" (Agresto, 1984,
p. 65).

Without judicial review serving as a "check,"

"legislative authority" could easily develop into
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"legislative autocracy" (p. 65).
Federal Court Decisions
Between the ratification of the Constitution and
the development of the Marbury case, federal courts
had used a sense of judicial review several times in
striking down state laws that were not in clear compliance with the Constitution (Fisher, 1990, p. 46).

In

regards to federal statutes, the federal judiciary wasn't
nearly as bold.

By 1801, the Supreme Court had yet

to solidify its position as a truly co-equal branch
of government.

While it had upheld the constitutionality

of Congressional statutes, it had never struck one down
(p.

46).
In the case of Hylton vs. United States in 1796,

the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a
federal law which placed a tax on carriages (p. 46).
From this, the question was raised that if the Supreme
Court could uphold a federal statute's constitutionality,
why couldn't it just as well declare its unconstitutionality? (p. 46).

In the case's opinion, however,

Justice Chase stipulated that "if this Court should
possess the power to declare an act of Congress void,
it should only exercise that power in very clear cases"
(p.

46).
Nevertheless, until the Marbury case, the federal
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judiciary would remain cautious in exercising judicial
review powers.

For the most part, it would confine

its review of legislation to state laws (p. 46).
The Politics of 1800 to 1803
Ironically, the actual precedented creation of
judicial review was largely attributable to the partisan
politics that had developed during the late 1790s.
During the election year of 1800, the United States
had become divided between two warring political
camps--the Federalists and the Jeffersonian-Republicans.
Since the days of the constitutional convention, the
Federalists had been in control of the national government.

Their views largely favored the supremacy of

the federal government and the centralization of its
power.

However, by 1800, their national popularity

had considerably waned.

Thomas Jefferson, leader of

the newly formed Republican Party, had become concerned
over the growth in the power of the federal government.
Favoring more of a state's rights approach in government,
the Jeffersonian-Republicans seized upon the Federalists'
unpopularity and overwhelmingly swept the elections
of 1800.

The Republicans were able to gain control

over both houses of Congress as well as to take control
of the presidency.

Realizing a disastrous defeat, the

Federalists looked for ways to salvage their dwindled
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power.
Having lost both the presidency and Congress to
the Republicans, the Federalists looked to the judiciary
as a "safe-haven" for political power.

Within days

before the newly-elected Republicans were to enter
office, the Federalists passed the Judiciary Act of
1801 which effectively created a number of new federal
judge positions.

In days following, President John

Adams nominated a number of Federalists to fill the
new posts.

The so-called "midnight" appointments were

all sent to the Senate and were confirmed.

However,

some of the new commissions, William Marbury's among
them, were never delivered.

When Thomas Jefferson

assumed the presidency, he ordered the commissions to
be withheld.

He also urged the newly-elected Congress

to repeal the Judiciary Act of 1801 that had created
the new federal judgeships.

This, they immediately

did.
Marbury vs. Madison
Under Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789,
the Supreme Court was empowered to issue writs of
mandamus--orders requiring public officials to perform
their duties.

When William Marbury was informed that

his appointment was void, he petitioned the Supreme
Court, under its original jurisdiction, to issue a writ

of mandamus ordering the new administration to deliver
his commission.

The Supreme Court, predominantly

Federalist in character, was in a difficult position.
Without a doubt, if the Court chose to issue the writ,
it would be going "head to head" against President
Jefferson (Gruver, 1985, p. 199).

Likewise, in such

a scenario, the President likely would refuse to comply
with such an order resulting in overwhelming embarassment
for the Court (p. 199).

If the Court refused to act,

it would, in effect, be yielding to the power of the
presidency (p. 199).

Such an action would set a

dangerous precedent for future institutional conflicts
(p. 199).
In the end, the Court would make a decision that
would allow it to "have its cake and eat it too."

In

writing the opinion for the Court, Chief Justice John
Marshall asked whether or not "the applicant had a right
to the commission he demanded" (Kelly and Harbison,
1963, p. 227).

Marshall believed that he did.

Since

the commission had been signed and sealed, Marshall
asserted, "to withhold it would, therefore, be an act
deemed by the Court not warranted by law, but violative
of a vested legal right" (p. 227).
As such, assuming the fact that William Marbury's
rights were violated, Marshall then proceeded to ask
whether or not "the laws of this country afforded him
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a remedy" (p. 227).

Marshall believed that the remedy

for Marbury's problem was simply to let him have his
commission.

Since Marbury had been nominated and con-

firmed for the commission, it was his constitutional
right to receive the commission.

In this case, the

President was clearly directed by an act of Congress
to carry out his duty--that duty being the deliverance
of Marbury's commission (p. 227).
However, in this case, the Court was being asked
to issue a writ of mandamus ordering the President to
deliver Marbury's commission.

In this scenario, it

was the Court that was being asked to remedy the problem.
As such, for Marshall, the question was whether or not
the Court could issue such a writ.

Clearly, Section

13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 authorized the Supreme
Court "to issue writs of mandamus to persons holding
office under the authority of the United States" (p.
228).

For Marshall, the question remained whether or

not the Court could legally issue such a writ under
its original jurisdiction.

He concluded that it could

not.
His reasoning was that Marbury had come to the
Court under its original jurisdiction requesting a remedy
for his legal problem.

The remedy he requested was

for the Court to issue a writ of mandamus ordering the
President to deliver his commission.

Nevertheless,
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Article III, Section 2, of the Constitution specifically
defined for the Court the extent of its original
jurisdiction powers.

The ability to issue a writ of

mandamus was not one of those specified powers in the
Court's original jurisdiction.

Given this, Congress

was not within its power to alter the Court's original
jurisdiction;

it could only change its appellate

jurisdiction.

Thus, the ability of Congress to give

the Court such a power in the Judiciary Act of 1789
"was not to be warranted by the Constitution" (p. 228).
Clearly, as such, Congress could not delegate such a
power, nor could the Court accept such a power (Gruver,
1985, p. 199).
By the fact that President Jefferson accepted the
Court's decision effectively established precedent for
the Court's usage of a judicial review power (p. 199).
If, as Marshall stipulated, the Constitution was to
be accepted as a "fundamental and paramount law of the
nation, then any law repugnant to the Constitution must
be void" (Kelly and Harbison, 1963, p. 228).

If any

statute conflicted with the Constitution, then it would
be the obligation of the Court to enforce the
Constitution and to declare the statute as unconstitutional (p. 228).

For, as Marshall asserted, it was

the duty of the Court "to say what the law is" (p. 228).
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Conclusion
In the years since the Marbury case, the Supreme
Court has effectively used its power of judicial review
to become an active member in the political process.
In fact, with judicial review, the Court has been able
to give in-depth definition to the scope of the American
Constitution.

Likewise, acting as the Constitution's

guardian, the Supreme Court has been able to insure
its supremacy to all other laws.

The Supreme Court

has also been responsible for resolving a myriad of
public issues.

From desegregation, to affirmative

action, to abortion, the Supreme Court has been an active
participant in the policy-making process.

As a result,

on several occasions, the Court has fallen "prey" to
a facade of criticism.
Anytime the Supreme Court engages in policy issues,
its decisions take on extra dimension.

Normally, within

a democracy, decisions of a political magnitude are
made by those who are directly accountable to the people.
However, because of the Court's unusual position within
the American Constitution, its members are not directly
answerable to society.

Still yet, using its power of

judicial review, the Court engages in policy that carries
serious societal ramifications.

In so doing, it is

permissible to ask the question whether or not the

Supreme Court should be involved in deciding issues
of this sort.

Within a democratic society, is it

entirely appropriate for the Court to be exercising
such overwhelming power over public policy issues?
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CHAPTER III
THE SUPREME COURT AND DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE
Introduction
Of all the controversial issues surrounding the
Supreme Court, none are anymore preeminent than the
fact that the Court is a seemingly undemocratic institution operating within the confines of a democratic
framework of government.

Democratic theory holds that

the people, in some respect, take part in government
either directly or indirectly.

Direct, or sometimes

referred to as pure, democracy implies that the people,
the citizenry, are responsible for government decisionmaking.

In essence, the people themselves make the

laws for their own community.

Indirect, or represen-

tative, democracy is where the people elect a certain
number of members of the citizenry to make decisions
for all the people.

The United States is a represen-

tative democracy.
On examination, what distinguishes a democracy
from other political systems?

Generally, a democracy

is governed by principles of political equality, political freedom, and majority rule (Mayo, 1960, pp. 58-71).
As defined,
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a democratic political sys~em is one in which
public policies are made, on a majority basis,
by representatives subject to effective control at periodic elections which are conducted
on the principles of political equality and
under conditions of political freedom (p.
70).
In sum, a democracy is a form of government in which
the supreme power is vested in the people.

Ideally,

in a democracy, the citizenry retains the right to choose
for itself the persons who will exercise decision-making
power on its behalf (Barnum, 1993, p. 9).

Specifically,

the exercise of decision-making power by governmental
leaders rests on the consent of the governed--the people

(p. 9).
Indeed, the Court and its power of judicial review
have become a focal point of controversy in American
politics.

By what right do life-tenured judges invali-

date policies adopted by popularly elected government
representatives?

If judicial review is of such crucial

importance for a written constitution, why did the
framers omit it?

Why is it based on implied, rather

than explicit, language?

Indeed, the Supreme Court

occupies an unusual position in the American political
spectrum.

By using judicial review, the Court becomes

a policy-maker.

As Chief Justice Charles E. Hughes

stated, "the power to interpret the law is the power
to make the law" (Fisher, 1990, p. 50).

However, unlike

a congressman or a president, justices are not directly

38

accountable to the American people.

The Constitution

holds that justices shall hold their offices during
"good behavior" (U.S. Constitution, art. 3, sec. 1).
On historical analysis, this implies life.
As a result of this unusual status, many legal
scholars, such as Raoul Berger and Robert Bork, allege
that the Court is an undemocratic policy-making institution and that judicial review is an undemocratic
feature of the political process.

In essence, "it is

an oligarchic institution functioning within a democratic
environment"

(Ball, 1987, p. 9).

Clearly, the Court's

special status requires both explanation and justification.
Democratic Theory
Before permanently casting the Supreme Court as
an undemocratic institution, we need to first define
what we mean by democratic government.

More specifi-

cally, what is a democracy?
Popular Control of Policy-Makers
Undoubtedly, the most important aspect of a democracy is its emphasis upon popular sovereignty--the fact
that the people have some essence of control over the
policy-making process.

Under pure democracy, the people

are directly responsible for government policy creation

The closest example in history of such a system was
ancient Athens and, even here, it is certainly questionable as to whether or not a "pure" democratic process
really existed.

Today, as in the United States, repre-

sentative democracy has become a chosen form of
democratic governance.

Under representative democracy,

the people choose a select few from the citizenry to
make decisions for them in government.
At the heart of representative democracy is the
idea of political accountability (Mayo, 1960, p. 61).
In essence, public officials or policy makers must be
answerable to the people from which they were chosen.
The "institutional embodiment of the principle universally regarded as indispensable" to this process is
the election (p. 61).

Through regularly held elections,

the people can hold public officials accountable for
their actions.

While the people do not have direct

control over government policy, through elections, they
do have direct control over those making government
policy (p. 63).
Political Equality and Freedom
With respect to political equality, the first and
foremost fundamental premise is that all adult citizens
have the right to vote--a recognition of universal suffrage (p. 63).

Likewise, each eligible voter should
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only have one vote and that particular vote should count
equally with anyone else's vote (p. 63).

And, ideally,

representatives should be elected in numbers proportional
to the votes cast for them (p. 63).
Democratic theory also holds that there should
be some guarantee of political freedom.
The electoral process must not be contaminated
by coercion or corruption, and voting itself
must take place by means of secret ballot.
Aspiring candidates must be free to form
political organizations and to campaign openly
for the office they seek. Freedom of speech
and press must be protected, and voters must
have access to various sources of information--not just information supplied, for
instance, by government itself--so they can
make an informed choice among candidates
(Barnum, 1993, p. 9).
Henry B. Mayo argues that these rules, both political equality and political freedom, are essential to
the functioning of democratic government (Mayo, 1960,
p. 66).

Their purpose,

to enable the effective choice of representatives to take place, i.e. to ensure the
popular control of decision-makers at election
time, and to keep the channels open to legitimate influence at all times (p. 66).
Together, political equality and political freedom
provide the voter with political power over government-democracy (p. 66).
Majority Rule Principle
Within the political process, decisions must be
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made.

These range, of course, from the selection of

representatives to the adoption of legislation.

In

arriving at these decisions, often times, conflicts
of interest may arise.

These various conflicts may

be between political decision-makers, interest groups,
or the public at large.

Howard Ball stipulates that

the political decisions developed from these various
"factions of interests" are the "outcome of intense,
complex negotiations" (Ball, 1987, p. 5).

As such,

democratic theory holds that when there is a "clash
of wills," the majority shall decide which decision
prevails (p. 5).
Certainly, within a democratic system of government,
majority rule provides for a means of selecting "among
alternative courses of action" (p. 5).

Indeed, it is

a means to filter and to determine the outcome of political disputes among the various interests involved
(Barnum, 1993, p. 9).

Whether it determine the winner

of an election or it decide which legislative proposal
shall become law, its ability to "govern the outcome
of disputes" makes it an essential part of the democratic
process (pp. 9-10).
Democratic Theory and the Supreme Court
On comparison, how well does the Supreme Court
conform to the ideals of democratic theory?

David Barnum
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asserts that the Court, by its very existence, "violates
several key principles which distinguish a democracy"
(p. 10).

In his analysis, Barnum considers four areas

in which the Court seemingly disrupts democratic theory.
The first area Barnum examines involves the method
by which Supreme Court justices are selected (p. 10).
Article II, Section 2, of the Constitution states that
the "Judges of the supreme Court shall be nominated
by the President with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate" (U.S. Constitution, art. 2, sec. 2).

Certainly,

with respect to democratic theory, this does not conform
to the idea of popular sovereignty.

By the fact that

justices of the Court are selected by the president
makes them faintly accountable to the American people.
The second area Barnum examines involves what he
terms "the extraordinary job security of Supreme Court
justices" (Barnum, 1993, p. 10).

Article III, Section

1, of the Constitution states that Supreme Court justices
"shall hold their Offices during good Behavior" (U.S.
Constitution, art 3, sec. 1).

On historical analysis,

"good behavior" simply implies life-tenure.

Again,

with respect to democratic theory, justices are not
susceptible to the periodic elections as are other
members of the political process.

Representatives,

presidents, and senators must, at periodic intervals,
face the electorate for approval or disapproval (Barnum,
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1993, p. 10).
The third area Barnum examines focuses on how
justices are removed from the Court (p. 11).

Given

that justices serve for "good behavior" and that they
are not directly responsible to the electorate, it
appears that there is no real means to remove a justice
involuntarily.

However, this is not exactly so.

Article

II, Section 4, of the Constitution provides that "all
Civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed
from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of,
Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors"
(U.S. Constitution, art 2, sec. 4).

Historically, on

only one occasion did impeachment charges against a
sitting justice come to complete fruition in Congress.
The circumstance, which occurred in 1804, involved
Justice Samuel Chase.

The charges against him, political

in nature, however, were found not to be adequate enough
to influence a necessary two-thirds of the Senate to
convict him and remove him from the bench (Barnum, 1993,
p. 203).

Hence, given that justices are not directly

accountable to an electorate and that they are rarely
ever removed from the bench by any other means, it stands
to argue , that the justices of the Supreme Court are
quite comfortably secure in their positions.
And finally, the fourth area Barnum examines involves the "unusual finality" of the Supreme Court's
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decisions (p. 11).

More specifically, its interpre-

tations which give meaning to the parameters of the
Constitution (p. 11 ).

Here, the concern lay with the

virtual inability of the political branches, both
Congress and the presidency, to override Supreme Court
constitutional decisions.

The only means possible,

constitutionally, is to adhere to the amending process
defined in Article V of the Constitution.

Article V

states that,
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both
Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose
Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the
Application of the Legislatures of two thirds
of the several States, shall call a Convention
for proposing Amendments, which, in either
Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when
ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths
of the several States, or by Conventions
in three fourths thereof, as the one or the
other Mode of Ratification may be proposed
by the Congress (U.S. Constitution, art.
5).
Since only four amendments have been passed which have
directly overridden Supreme Court constitutional decisions, it quite logically stands to reason that the
amending process is not quite a feasible method of
altering the Court's rulings.

As David Barnum states,

"once again it becomes clear that the Court's power
is not entirely compatible with the basic principles
of democratic self-government'' (Barnum, 1993, p. 11).
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A Justification for Judicial Review
Where exactly does this leave the Supreme Court
in American democracy?

If the United States is defined

as a democratic system of government, how can we explain
the mere existence of the Supreme Court?

How can we

justify the Supreme Court's exercise of a judicial review
power over legislation if the Court itself is in violation of democratic principle?
Certainly, one avenue that might be taken to defend
the Supreme Court, and its power of judicial review,
leads us down a path which questions the very validity
of American democracy.

The essence of this argument

lays in the fact that it asserts that the United States
might not be the "pristine example" of democratic government we all admire and respect (pp. 13-14).

Indeed,

there might be other features of American government,
like the Supreme Court, that are not quite compatible
to democratic theory or to democratic governance (pp.
13-14).

These include, for instance, the electoral

college system, state legislative selection of U.S.
senators (although, now abolished by Amendment XVII),
congressional committees, the Senate filibuster, to
name but a few (pp. 13-14).

These, as the Supreme Court,

are as well violations of key principles of majoritarian
democracy (pp. 13-14).
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Nevertheless, can we adequately justify the Court's
exercise of a judicial review power by merely pointing
out that it is only one of several non-democratic aspects
of American government?

As David Barnum stipulates,

can we defend the Supreme Court and its power by arguing
"that two wrongs make a right" (p. 14)?

If we cannot,

then, where do we turn in an attempt to provide some
sense of justification for the Court's use of a judicial
review power?
Constitutionalism
Constitutionalism refers to a "written document
which sets forth the structure of the government and
specifies the power of those who serve in its offices"
(Schrems, 1986, pp. 225-226).

Of key significance to

constitutionalism is its emphasis upon limited government
and rule of law (p. 226).

As such, government power

is "proscribed and procedures prescribed" within the
parameters of a constitution (Andrews, 1968, p. 13).
Meaning, more specifically, that government power emanates from and is limited by a constitution.

A

constitution provides for a framework of government.
It formally establishes the government's institutions,
defines their functions, and spells out the extent of
their power (p. 13).

Likewise, it is also a "contract"

between the government and the people.

By limiting
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government power, a constitution can provide for the
security of the people against governmental encroachments
or abuses.

Clearly, "the state is forbidden to trespass

in areas reserved for private activity" {p. 13).
American Constitutionalism
Fearful of absolute power, the founding fathers
were emphatic in their belief that American government
should be based upon and guided by a written constitution--a constitution which would, for all intents
and purposes, set limits on the power of government.
No governmental institution and certainly no governmental
official would be all powerful.

Under a written consti-

tution, the powers of government would flow from the
constitution and would be subject to the limitations
prescribed in it.

The framers, aware of the potential

for government abuses of political power, built into
the American Constitution certain "correctives" that
would limit this possibility (Ball, 1987, p. 6).
Among these "correctives" is the Bill of Rights-the first ten amendments of the Constitution (p. 6).
The purpose of the Bill of Rights is largely to protect
the minority against the "popular will" of the majority
(p. 6).

Here, majority is referring to those who are

in control of government power--the majority of Congress,
for instance (p. 6).

The individual's right to speech
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and protection against unlawful searches and seizures
must take precedent over the will of the majority.
In that respect, the Bill of Rights serves as a "safehaven" against the potential "tyranny of the majority."
Certainly, it is an embodiment of rights and protections
for the individual against the encroaching, and sometimes
abusive, power of government.
Among other "correctives" built into the Constitution, that would limit government power, are what
James Madison referred to as "auxiliary precautions"
(p. 6).

These "auxiliary precautions" include separation

of powers, checks and balances, and federalism (p. 6).
In order to protect against the abuses of government
power, the founding fathers believed that power must
not be allowed to concentrate;
and fragmented" (p. 6).

it must be "separated

Power would be divided and

overlapped between three branches of government--the
executive, the legislative, and the judiciary.

No one

branch of government would possess enough power for
itself to take complete command of the governmental
apparatus.
Likewise, governmental power would be divided
between two levels of government--the national level
and the states.

As Amendment X to the Constitution

states,
The powers not delegated to the United States
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by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it
to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people (U.S. Constitution, amend. 10).
Clearly, in this respect, the power of the national
government is merely a delegation of power to it from
the states and the people.

More specifically, it is

a power that rests upon the consent of the governed--the
sovereignty of the people.
Constitutional Democracy
Where does this tangent on constitutionalism lead
us with respect to finding some justification for the
Supreme Court's exercise of judicial review?

David

Barnum believes it leads us back to questioning the
validity of American democracy (Barnum, 1993, pp. 248272).

Can we truly say that the United States is a

perfect example of majoritarian democracy?
asserts that we cannot (pp. 248-272).

Barnum

Instead, we must

categorize the United States as a constitutional democracy--a democracy that both respects majoritarianism
and fears it (pp. 250-251).

It is a democracy that

is based upon a written Constitution--one that prescribes
government powers and limits them (pp. 250-251).

Indeed,

it is a democracy premised upon a Madisonian ideal of
democratic self-governance.
Madison and other framers supported the establishment of a representative democracy based
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on principles of popular sovereignty and
majority rule. At the same time, they insisted on the need for constitutional limits
on governmental power and constitutional
guarantees of individual rights. In the
end, therefore, the democracy they envisioned
was not exclusively majoritarian in its features. Rather, it was a constitutional
democracy, that is, a democracy premised
on the need to maintain a delicate balance
between majority rule and minority rights
(p.

251).

It is this aspect of American democracy that can be
used as a defense for the Court's exercise of a judicial
review power.
The Supreme Court and Constitutional Democracy
In order to effectively defend the Supreme Court's
exercise of judicial review, we must return to
ChiefJustice Marshall's opinion in the Marbury vs.
Madison case.
In his obiter dictum, Marshall begins by questioning
whether or not "an act repugnant to the constitution
can become the law of the land" (Fisher, 1990, p. 64).
The constitution is either a supreme paramount
law, unchangeable by ordinary means, or it
is on a level with ordinary legislative acts,
and, like other acts, is alterable when the
legislature shall please to alter it (pp.
64-65).
Marshall argues that a written constitution is designed
to be "supreme" and "permanent" (p. 64).

If it is not,

and it can be changed at will, then written constitutions
are nothing more than "absurd attempts, on the part
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of the people, to limit a power in its own nature
illimitable" (p. 65).

Written constitutions, as Marshall

reiterates, must be viewed as a "fundamental and paramount law"--a law that both establishes and limits
government power (p. 65).

As such, it is only obvious

that "an act • • . repugnant to the Constitution is void"
(p.

65).
Marshall places the duty to "expound and interpret"

the meaning of the Constitution in the hands of the
judiciary (p. 65).

Indeed, "it is emphatically the

province and duty of the judicial department to say
what the law is" (p. 65).

Clearly, if any "ordinary

act" is in direct conflict with the Constitution's
language, the Court, must out of necessity, rule in
favor of the Constitution (pp. 64-65).
For support of his premise that the Court is
obligated to uphold the meaning of the Constitution,
Marshall turns to the Constitution itself.
Could it be the intention of those who gave
this power to say that in using it the constitution should not be looked into? That a
case arising under the constitution should
be decided without examining the instrument
under which it arises? Ought the judges
to close their eyes on the constitution,
and only see the law? (p. 65).
Marshall believes that the language of the Constitution
is "addressed especially to the courts" (p. 66).
is an outline which provides for the following:

It
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(a) creation of government, (b) limits on government,
and (c) rules of evidence (p. 66).

In that respect,

the legislature, nor any other department of government,
can arbitrarily change the rules of the game.

All "are

bound by that instrument"--the Constitution (p. 66).
If the Constitution is to be accepted as "the
supreme law of the land," then all laws must "be made
in pursuance of the Constitution" (p. 66).

Those laws

that are not must of necessity be declared as unconstitutional by the Court.

If the Court cannot possibly

possess such a power, they why does the Constitution
"direct the judges to take an oath to support it (p.
66).
Conclusion
The democracy envisioned by the framers to the
Constitution was not a democracy based on pure majoritarian principles (Barnum, 1993, p. 258).

Indeed, it

was a democracy that attempted to find some balance
between majority rule and minority rights (p. 258).
Moreover, it was a democracy that sought to limit government power and to protect the individual's rights (p.
258).

In that respect, it might be more accurate to

refer to the American system of government as a constitutional democracy, not a majoritarian one (p. 258).
The United States government is based upon and is limited

CHAPTER IV
RESTRAINTS ON THE SUPREME COURT'S POWER
Introduction
Since Marbury vs. Madison, the Supreme Court has
exercised a "guardian" role to the American Constitution.
In that role, the Court has been primarily responsible
for insuring that the other political branches of the
government adhere to the language found within the Constitution.

As stipulated by Chief Justice John Marshall,

If the courts are to regard the constitution,
and the constitution is superior to any
ordinary act of the legislature, the constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern
the case to which they both apply (Fisher,
1990, p. 65)
Indeed, the language in the Constitution is general
and vague;

its language could mean several things to

different people.

"Freedom of speech," "unreasonable

searches and seizures," "necessary and proper," and
"due process of law" are incredibly broad phrases.
Their scope could cover a wide spectrum of definitions.
The Court must give meaning to this type of vague terminology, found within the Constitution, for it to be
an effective tool of government.

Certainly, the founding

fathers gave us an elaborate framework of government,
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but they left to succeeding generations the responsibility of bringing life to it.

In that respect, the

Court has played, and does play, a key role in defining
constitutional law.
This role, however, has placed the Supreme Court
in the midst of immense political controversy.

Indeed,

it has earned the Court the name "continuous constitutional convention" (Berger, 1977, p. 2).

Anytime

the Court interprets the Constitution, it must find
someway for justification of its opinion.

In many cases,

that may require that the Court give new or revised
definition to a broad constitutional clause.

Indeed,

there are several ways the Court can go about this task.
It can examine, for instance, any of the following:
(a) the text of the Constitution, (b) the original intent
of the framers to the Constitution, (c) implicit premises
or "tacit postulates" of the Constitution which order
the relationship between the institutions of government
and with the people, (d) legal precedent, (e) evidence
on American traditions and practices, (f) evidence on
contemporary morality and attitudes, and

(g) consider-

ations of practicality and prudence (Geel, 1991, p.
67).

Problems arise, however, when the Court's decisions
appear as if there is really no clear justification
for their conclusions.

Raoul Berger argues, for
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instance, that the Supreme Court has taken the Fourteenth
Amendment and has dangerously distorted its original
intent.
The Fourteenth Amendment is the case study
par excellence of what Justice Harlan described as the Supreme Court's 'exercise
of the amending power,' its continuing revision of the Constitution under the guise
of interpretation (Berger, 1977, p. 1 ).
Obviously, at times, it is quite evident that the Court
has gone beyond the Constitution for justification of
its opinions.

Indeed, Justice Douglas used some exqui-

site judicial craftsmanship when he cited, in Griswold
vs. Connecticut (1965), that the "right to privacy"
could be found within the "penumbras" or "shadows" of
the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments
and could be made applicable to the states through the
guise of the Fourteenth Amendment (O' Brien, 1991, pp.
283 & 308-319).

Undoubtedly, it is this type of judicial

creativity that has brought the Court to the "storm
centre" of political controversy (O'Brien, 1990, p.
1 3) •

But, we must ask, is the Supreme Court truly deserving of these characterizations?

Are we to assume,

as a nation, that we have evolved into a "government
by judiciary"?

Has this "least dangerous branch" of

government altered its own position in such a way as
to become our most dangerous branch?

Or, have we
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inflated the dangers we believe to be apparent in the
Supreme Court?

Has, in fact, the Supreme Court only

been doing what it was intended to do--interpret the
Constitution?
Lest we forget, the Supreme Court is not the only
institution of government.

It is still part of a complex

system of checks and balances.

As such, there are numer-

ous means, both within the Constitution and outside
of it, by which the Court's power can be restrained.
Undoubtedly, these "checks" can serve as a potential
means by which society can retain majoritarian control
over the Supreme Court's power.
Restraints on the Supreme Court's Power
Certainly, there are numerous restraints on the
power of the Supreme Court (Barnum, 1993, pp. 194-195).
Among these, are what David Barnum refers to as "informal" restraints on the Supreme Court's power and "formal"
restraints on the Supreme Court's power (p. 197).
Informal Restraints
David Barnum defines informal restraints as "those
methods of exerting pressure on the Court which are
not explicitly or formally authorized by the Constitution" (p. 197).

These include, for instance, both

political reaction to the Court and public reaction
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to the Court.
Political Reaction
Anytime the Supreme Court involves itself in
controversial issues--abortion, school prayer, desegregation--it is more than likely that the Court will
elicit some kind of a response--either positive or
negative--from political leaders or the public (pp.
198-199).
The Court, throughout its history, has received
its fair share of negative political criticism.

Indeed,

with respect to the other political branches of government, much of this criticism has come from the president
himself.
For obvious reasons, the president's views
on the Supreme Court may carry special
weight. In 1937, President Roosevelt proposed to enlarge the Court to fifteen
members. He recommended adding one justice
to the Court for every sitting justice over
the age of seventy. Defending his plan
in a 'fireside chat' to the nation, Roosevelt
said that 'we have • • • reached the point
as a Nation where we must take action to
save the Constitution from the Court and
the Court from itself.' Sharpening his
political rhetoric, Roosevelt went on to
say that his plan to appoint additional
justices to the Court would bring into the
judicial system 'new and younger blood'
and would 'save our National Constitution
from hardening of the judicial arteries'
(p. 198).
Although Roosevelt's Court-packing plan was later
condemned as a "needless, futile, and utterly dangerous
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abandonment of constitutional principle," it is evident
that the Supreme Court, during the same year, "had become
more accepting of New Deal programs" (Fisher, 1991,
p. 542).

As Roosevelt later asserted, "the old minority

of 1935 and 1936 had become the majority of 1937--without
a single new appointment of a justice" (p. 542).

As

Table 1 suggests, there have also been other occasions
in American history in which a sitting president has
come into conflict with the Court.
Table 1
Presidents in Conflict With the Supreme Court
PRESIDENT

ISSUE

YEARS

Thomas Jefferson

Judicial review

1800s

Andrew Jackson

Bank (Fed) charter

1830s

Abraham Lincoln

Slavery

1860s

Franklin Roosevelt

New Deal programs

1930s

Dwight Eisenhower

Desegregation

1950s

Richard Nixon

Criminal Rights

1960s

Source:

Barnum, David. THE SUPREME COURT AND AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY. New York: St. Martin's ~ress,
1993, pp. 198 & 205

This is certainly not to say, however, that criticism of the Court has been limited to the Oval Office.
Congressmen, senators, governors, civil rights leaders,
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religious leaders, and even other judges have all at
one time or another expressed their disappointment with
a particular Supreme Court decision (Barnum, 1993, pp.
199-200).

The point to be made is that we all live

in a "free country";

"politicians and other influential

citizens" have a right "to criticize the Supreme Court"
(p.

198).
Public ·Reaction
As with political figures, the people can, likewise,

become disillusioned over a Supreme Court decision.
In many cases, they, too, can become "vocal" over what
they perceive as an incorrect Supreme Court ruling.
Certainly, in 1973, when the Supreme Court handed down
its opinion for the Roe vs. Wade case, it ignited immense
public outcry from those who were fundamentally opposed
to abortion (pp. 200-201).

The same can also be said

in 1989 when the Court struck down a state anti-flag
burning statute in the Texas vs. Johnson case (Baum,
1992, p. 137).
Accordingly, public reaction to the Court can take
numerous "shapes."

David Barnum cites at least four:

(1) public reaction to Court decisions through opinion
polls, (2) public demonstrations for or against Court
decisions,

(3) public intimidation of Court personnel,

and (4) public resistance to Court decisions (Barnum,
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1993, p. 199).
The Effectiveness of Informal Restraints
The point to be made from these brief discussions
of political and public reaction is that the Supreme
Court does not operate in a "political vacuum."

Indeed,

it is susceptible to a wide array of criticism--both
within government and outside of it.

The effectiveness

of this criticism, however, remains the only question.
Are Supreme Court justices influenced by what other
political leaders or the public have to say about its
decisions?
Without a doubt, the Supreme Court "enjoys greater
freedom from environmental pressures than do most other
policy makers" (Baum, 1992, p. 135).

Indeed, according

to Lawrence Baum, the Court's apparent freedom from
its "environment" has several sources:
The most important is the lifetime term,
which reduces tremendously justices' dependence on public opinion and on other policy
makers. Formal and practical constraints
on interest group activity in the judiciary
augment the Court's freedom. Finally, the
Court's status as the highest judicial body
eliminates the review by judicial superiors
that limits the autonomy of lower courts
(p.

136).

As to whether or not the Court is isolated to political
or public influence, Baum continues,
But by no means is the Court completely
insulated from the outside world. Indeed,
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each element of the environment--public
opinion, media, interest groups, Congress,
president, other policy makers--exerts a
meaningful influence on the Court. Collectively, they have a substantial impact on
the Court's decisions (p. 136).
Public Opinion Illustrated:

The War on Drugs

In 1986, Justice William Brennan was asked whether
or not public opinion had any impact on Court decisions
(p. 137).

His response was, "None!" (p. 137).

is that true?

But

His ideological counterpart, Chief Justice

William Rehnquist asserted in the same year that,
Judges, so long as they are relatively normal
human beings, can no more escape being influenced by public opinion in the long run
than can people working at other jobs (p.
138) •
Baum argues that the Supreme Court is not like
most other policy makers in that it is not directly
accountable to an electorate (p. 136).

For instance,

a legislator will attempt to act more in tune with his
constituents' viewpoints so that he may serve them more
"effectively" (p. 136).

His objective is to please

his constituency so that he can "maintain its support
for future elections" (p. 136).

Justices of the Court,

on the other hand, do not represent any constituency
(p. 136).

Clearly, they "do not depend on public opin-

ion to keep their positions" (p. 136).
points out,

But, as Baum
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Still, justices might pay attention to public
opinion simply because they want to be liked,
and a few justices have been concerned about
their popularity because they harbored political ambitions. More important, justices
are concerned about public regard for the
Court, because high regard can help to protect the Court in conflicts with other
branches and increase people's willingness
to carry out its decisions (p. 136).
Baum cites the current "war on drugs" effort as
an example of what he believes to be a case par excellence of the Supreme Court seemingly aligning itself
with public opinion.

As society's concern over the

drug issue intensifies, "the Court has shown a striking
willingness to approve of government actions that are
aimed at controlling illegal drugs" (p. 137).
1.

In United States vs. Monsanto (1989), the

Supreme Court ruled 5-4 that a federal statute providing
for pretrial freezing and posttrial forfeiture of the
proceeds from violations of the drug laws, including
assets that a defendent sought to use for attorneys'
fees, does not violate the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel (p. 138).
2.

In Employment Division vs. Smith (1990), the

Supreme Court ruled 6-3 that an Oregon statute that
prohibits the use of the drug peyote, when applied to
its use in a ceremony of the Native American Church,
does not violate the First Amendment's protection of
the free exercise of religion (p. 138).
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3.

In Harmelin vs. Michigan (1991), the Supreme

Court ruled 5-4 that a state law requiring a sentence
of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole
for possession of more than 650 grams of cocaine does
violate the Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and
unusual punishment (p. 138).
Baum argues that each of these cases serves as
an example of a Court willing to limit an individual's
civil liberties in an effort to ''help attack what is
widely viewed as a major national problem" (p. 137).
In each of these cases, according to Baum, it is clear
that the Court has aligned itself to public opinion.
Conclusion:

Informal Restraints

In reality, however, how much do political and
public opinion influence the Court's decisions?

What

impact, if any, do they have on the decision-making
behavior of Supreme Court justices?

Is there some empir-

ical means by which we can measure a relationship between
political and public opinion and Court decisions?
Lawrence Baum indicates that it is evident that
the Court does sometimes align itself to political and
public opinion.

But he also asserts that these "in-

stances are difficult to pinpoint" (p. 136).

The Court

was designed "to be an institution capable of withstanding political pressure" (Barnum, 1993, p. 201).
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Indeed, there are numerous occasions throughout American
history when the Court has "adopted highly unpopular
policies"--pre-1937 New Deal decisions (Baum, 1992,
p. 137).

And, likewise, there are occasions in American

history when the Court seems to exhibit a preference
for political and public opinion in its decisions--post1937 New Deal decisions.

The fact is that we really

are unsure as to how much both political and public
opinion can influence the Supreme Court (Barnum, 1993,
p. 201).

It is probably safe to say that political

and public opinion do influence the Court, but to what
extent, who knows? (p. 201).
Formal Restraints
Formal restraints on the Supreme Court's power
are those methods which "are more formal in nature"
(p. 197).

In that respect, these type of restraints

are more likely to be found within the confines of the
Constitution or to be implied by it.

Formal restraints

can be considered as part of our government's system
of checks and balances;

they are powers given to the

president and to Congress by the Constitution which
may be prescribed by them as "checks" against the Supreme
Court's power.
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Appointment
Article II of the Constitution stipulates that
the president "shall nominate, and by and with the Advice
and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Judges of the
Supreme Court" (U.S. Constitution, art. 2, sec. 2).
While the appointment power is not, in itself, a recognized restraint on the power of the Court, it can,
nevertheless, "represent an effective way to keep the
Court in line with the preferences of a majority of
the American people" (Barnum, 1993, p. 220).

In that

respect, "the president's power to appoint Supreme Court
Justices [can serve as] a viable strategy by which the
political system can exert 'internal influence' on
Supreme Court decision making" (p. 220).
The appointment of new justices to the Supreme
Court is a highly politicized process.

Indeed, justices

on the Court, according to Article III, "shall hold
their offices during good Behavior" (U.S. Constitution,
art. 3, sec. 1).

However, on historical analysis, "good

behavior" simply translates into life tenure.

Thus,

any new appointment to the Court will remain on the
high bench, in all likelihood, for the remainder of
his life.

In this regard, his legal viewpoints become

matters of extreme political significance.
A president who has a desire to leave his imprint

on the Court will consider these legal viewpoints as
criteria for recourse in his selection of a nominee
to the Court.

Hence, any nominee that he chooses for

the Court will more than likely share with himself a
similar ideological orientation.

Obviously, when Presi-

dent Roosevelt had an opportunity to nominate his first
justice to the Court in 1937, he was looking for somebody
who shared with himself a similar viewpoint on national
economic policy--the New Deal.

As Table 2 suggests,

this has, historically, been a common practice.
Table 2
Federal Judicial Appointments With Same Party Affiliation
as the President, 1888-1985
PRESIDENT

PARTY

PERCENTAGE

Cleveland

Democrat

97.3

B. Harrison

Republican

87.9

McKinley

Republican

95.7

T. Roosevelt

Republican

95.8

Taft

Republican

82.2

Wilson

Democrat

98.6

Harding

Republican

97.7

Coolidge

Republican

94.1

Hoover

Republican

85.7

F. D. Roosevelt

Democrat

96.4

Truman

Democrat

90.1
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Table 2--Continued
PRESIDENT

PARTY

PERCENTAGE

Eisenhower

Republican

94. 1

Kennedy

Democrat

90.9

L.B. Johnson

Democrat

93.2

Nixon

Republican

93.7

Ford

Republican

79.0

Carter

Democrat

94.7

Reagan

Republican

97.0

Source:

Ball, Howard. COURTS AND POLITICS. Englewood
Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1987, p. 176.

The Senate, too, can play an important role in
shaping the ideological perspective of the Court.
Undoubtedly, while the president may select a nominee
for the Court, it is the Senate that must give final
confirmation to his choice (by a majority vote).
Historically, the Senate has, for the most part, been
rather consonant to most of the presidents' choices
for the high bench.

This is certainly not to say,

however, as clearly indicated in Table 3, that the Senate
has never been reluctant to exercise its constitutional
prerogative to reject a president's nominee.

Indeed,

since 1789, out of a total of 147 nominations to the
Supreme Court, 28 have failed to gain Senate confirmation
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(Barnum, 1993, pp. 223-224).
Table 3
Supreme Court Nominations Rejected, Postponed, or
Withdrawn Because of Senate Opposition
NOMINEE

YEAR

NOMINATED BY

William Paterson

1793

Washington

Withdrawn

John Rutledge

1795

Washington

Rejected

Alexander Wolcott

1 811

Madison

Rejected

John Crittenden

1828

J.Q. Adams

Postponed

Roger Taney

1835

Jackson

Postponed

John Spencer

1844

Tyler

Rejected

Reuben Walworth

1844

Tyler

Withdrawn

Edward King

1844

Tyler

Postponed

Edward King

1844

Tyler

Withdrawn

John Read

1845

Tyler

No Action

George Woodward

1845

Polk

Rejected

Edward Bradford

1852

Fillmore

No Action

George Badger

1853

Fillmore

Postponed

William Micou

1853

Fillmore

No Action

Jeremiah Black

1861

Buchanan

Rejected

Henry Stanbery

1866

Johnson

No Action

Ebenezer Hoar

1869

Grant

Rejected

George Williams

1873

Grant

Withdrawn

Caleb Cushing

1874

Grant

Withdrawn

Stanley Matthews

1881

Hayes

No Action

ACTION
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Table 3--Continued
NOMINEE

YEAR

NOMINATED BY

William Hornblower

1893

Cleveland

Rejected

Wheeler Peckham

1894

Cleveland

Rejected

John Parker

1930

Hoover

Rejected

Abe Fortas

1968

Johnson

Withdrawn

Horner Thornberry

1968

Johnson

No Action

Clement Haynsworth

1969

Nixon

Rejected

G. Harrold Carswell

1970

Nixon

Rejected

Robert Bork

1987

Reagan

Rejected

Douglas Ginsburg

1987

Reagan

Withdrawn

Source:

ACTION

O'Brien, David. STORM CENTER. New York:
W. w. Norton and Company, 1990, p. 71 •

Without a doubt, the appointment process can be,
and has been, used as a means to "control or reshape"
the political orientation of the Supreme Court (Barnum,
1993, p. 244).

As such, anytime a president can appoint

a new justice to the Court, it is an opportunity for
him to influence the internal political make-up of the
Court.

As stipulated by David Barnum,

Overall, presidents have been successful
about 75 percent of the time in selecting
justices who continue, during their tenure
on the Court, to reflect the president's
views. A president who is careful in selecting justices and makes ideological
compatibility a principal criterion for selection can practically guarantee that his

72
Court ruled that a state could be sued in federal court
by a plaintiff from another state.

Its decision, how-

ever, was overruled by Amendment XI (1795) to the
Constitution which stated that "The Judicial power of
the United States shall not be construed to extend to
any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by Citizens of another
State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign States"
(U.S. Constitution, amend. 11).
2.

In Dred Scott vs. Sandford (1857), the Supreme

Court ruled that blacks as a class were not citizens
protected under the Constitution.

Its decision was

overruled by Amendment XIV (1868) to the Constitution
which stated that "All persons born or naturalized in
the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside" (U.S. Constitution, amend. 14,
sec. 1 ) •
3.

In Pollock vs. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co.

(1895), the Supreme Court ruled that a federal income
tax was unconstitutional.

However, its decision was

overruled by Amendment XVI (1913) to the Constitution
which stated that "The Congress shall have the power
to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source
derived, without apportionment among the several States,
and without regard to any census or enumeration" (U.S.
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Constitution, amend. 16).
4.

In Oregon vs. Mitchell (1970), the Supreme

Court ruled that Congress did not possess the constitutional power to lower the minimum voting age in state
elections to eighteen.

Its decision was overruled by

Amendment XXVI (1971) to the Constitution which stated
that "The right of citizens of the United States, who
are eighteen years of age or older, to vote shall not
be denied or abridged by the United States or by any
State on account of age" (U.S. Constitution, amend.
26, sec. 1 ) •
There have, of course, been several other attempts
to amend the Constitution in an effort to override
Supreme Court constitutional decisions.

But these

efforts, however, have not met with similar success.
Court Packing
Nowhere within the Constitution does it give a
specific indication as to the number of justices that
should sit on the Supreme Court.

Indeed, "the Consti-

tution says nothing about the size of the Supreme Court"
whatsoever (Barnum, 1993, p. 202).

As a result, through-

out the Supreme Court's history, it has been either
the president or the Congress which have been responsible
for setting the number of Court justices (p. 202).
This number, of course, has ranged anywhere from as
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low as five justices to as high as ten justices.

In

1869, however, Congress set the number of Court justices
at nine;

it has remained that number ever since (p.

202) •

The most notorious attempt in American history
to change the Court's size for political reasons was
President Roosevelt's infamous Court-packing plan in
1937.

Faced with a Court whose laissez-faire views

were adamantly against any of his New Deal policies,
President Roosevelt believed he had no other option
than to "pack" the Court with more accepting justices.
President Roosevelt's plan stipulated that he would
be authorized to appoint a new justice for every sitting
justice that was over the age of 70;

the Court, how-

ever, would be limited to a maximum of 15 justices.
Given this, President Roosevelt would most assuredly
be allowed to appoint at least six new justices to the
Court--six new justices who were likely to be supportive
of his New Deal.

As a disguise for his real intent,

President Roosevelt asserted that the "additional justices would help relieve the delay and congestion that
resulted from aged or infirm judges" (Fisher, 1990,
p. 541).

His plan would serve as a means to help these

elderly justices complete their workload in a timely
fashion.
In its examination of his Court-packing bill,

however, the Senate Judiciary Committee was not completely taken in by President Roosevelt's "helping-hand"
argument.

Indeed, it viewed his plan as nothing more

than contemptible.

It was clear to the committee that

President Roosevelt's ultimate objective was nothing
more than an underhanded effort to "apply force to the
judiciary" (p. 542).

The bill, the committee asserted,

was "needless, futile, and utterly dangerous" (p. 542).
In its final report, the committee used excessively
harsh language so as to insure "that [a] parallel [to
Roosevelt's Court-packing plan would] never again be
presented to the free representatives of the free people
of America" (p. 542).

As Louis Fisher points out,

Its report methodically and mercilessly
[shredded] the bill's premises, structure,
content, and motivation. This searing indictment constituted an extraordinary
determination on the part of the committee
to pulverize Roosevelt's creation and bury
it forever (p. 541).
This objective, the Senate Judiciary Committee succeeded
in doing quite well.
Response to Decisions:

Statutory

Anytime Congress passes legislation, its subject
matter is potentially open to Supreme Court review.
While the Supreme Court, in most cases, will attempt
to adhere to the legislation's actual intent, there
are those instances when its interpretation of that
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legislation might differ with what Congress originally
intended.

Lawrence Baum argues that when this happens,

If an effective majority in Congress disagrees
with the Court's interpretation of a provision, that provision simply can be changed
in new legislation to overcome the Court's
interpretation (Baum, 1992, p. 230).
But as Baum continues, "most of the Court's statutory
decisions arouse little notice or controversy in Congress" (p. 230).

This is certainly not to say, however,

that Supreme Court statutory decisions always go unnoticed.

There are times when members of Congress do

attempt to override such rulings.
1.

The Federal Employees Liability Reform and

Tort Compensation Act of 1988 overturned Westfall vs.
Erwin (1988) by reestablishing immunity for federal
employees from lawsuits based on actions taken as employees (p. 230).
2.

The Veterans Benefits and Programs Improvement

Act of 1988 overturned Traynor vs. Turnage (1988) by
declaring that the disabling effects of chronic alcoholism are not the result of wiilful misconduct for
purposes of determining eligibility for veterans' benefits (p. 230).
3.

The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 overturned

McNally vs. United States (1987) by holding that a
"scheme or artifice to defraud" under the mail fraud
statute includes defrauding people and governments of
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the intangible right to honest public services (p. 230).
4.

The Federal Courts Study Committee Implemen-

tation Act of 1990 overturned Finley vs. United States
(1989) by giving the federal courts broader power to
hear claims under state law that are related to claims
that fall under federal jurisdiction (p. 230).
5.

The Older Workers Benefit Protection Act of

1990 overturned Public Employees Retirement System vs.
Betts (1989) by prohibiting discrimination on the basis
of age in all employee benefits (p. 230).
These attempts, nevertheless, for the most part
fail (p. 230).

Indeed, as Baum asserts, "a great major-

ity of the Court's statutory decisions are left standing"
(p. 230).

He points out, for instance, that between

1950 and 1972, out of 222 decisions in labor and antitrust law, Congress was only able to successfully
overturn nine (p. 230).

In another study, between 1968

and 1988, Baum points out that only 33 statutory decisions were overruled successfully, "only a fraction
of the bills introduced for that purpose" (p. 230).
Still yet, Baum argues that "Congress does intervene
often enough to play a significant role in reshaping
the Court's interpretations of statutes (p. 230).
Response to Decisions:

Constitutional

As stipulated earlier, the Supreme Court is the
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final arbiter in matters of constitutional interpretation.

Short of amending the Constitution, there would

appear to be very little Congress or the president could
do with respect to overriding Supreme Court constitutional decisions.

But as David Barnum asserts, "in

the real world of constitutional politics, nothing is
quite that simple" (Barnum, 1993, p. 209).

He stipulates

that there are "a number of purely legislative options
for at least circumventing, if not reversing, the Court's
constitutional decisions" (p. 209).
1.

These include:

Nothing in the Constitution prevents Congress

from going further than the Court in protecting rights.
2.

The Court itself can invite Congress to adopt

legislation that overcomes a particular constitutional
problem identified by the Court (pp. 209-210).
Certainly, whenever the Supreme Court hands down
a constitutional decision, it must, often times, provide
parameters for what it believes are the protections
granted to us in the Constitution.

However, nothing

in the Constitution stipulates that Congress [or the
states] are limited to these protections.

Obviously,

Congress cannot pass legislation that falls short of
these protections, but it can, if it wishes, pass legislation that goes beyond them.

As such, "Congress may

pass legislation protecting individual rights, even
though the Court has concluded that the Constitution

itself does not do so" (p. 209).

For instance, in 1978,

the Supreme Court ruled in Zurcher vs. Stanford Daily
that "the Fourth Amendment did not prevent the police
from searching a newspaper office provided they were
armed with a search warrant" (p. 209).

However, Con-

gress, in 1980, passed a statute which provided that
the police could, in most instances, "proceed on the
basis of a subpoena" (p. 209).

As opposed to a search

warrant, Congress believed that a subpoena would provide
the newspaper "an opportunity to challenge the validity
of the search before rather than after it [had] occurred"

(p. 209).
Often times, whenever the Supreme Court makes a
decision, it may, in its opinion, encourage Congress
[or the states] to pass legislation that corrects "the
particular constitutional problems identified by the
Court" (p. 209).

This is clearly evident in the Furman

vs. Georgia case (1972) in which the Supreme Court declared that capital punishment was in violation of the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution.
However, in its opinion, the Court was sharply divided.
In fact, "the opinion announcing the Court's decision
was a brief per curiam opinion followed by 231 pages
of separate opinions filed by all nine justices"
(O'Brien, 1991, p. 1075).

Nevertheless, Justice Potter

Stewart, in his plurality opinion, stipulated that "if
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states could reduce the capriciousness with which the
death penalty was actually imposed, he and other members
of the Court might be disposed to reconsider their decision" (Barnum, 1993, p. 209).

This they did, in the

1976 case of Gregg vs. Georgia in which the Court ruled
that capital punishment was constitutional (p. 209).
As these two examples suggest, Congress [or the
states] can, if they wish, "[reverse] a Supreme Court
decision with which they disagree" (p. 210).

Clearly,

in neither case, did Congress [or the states] have to
resort to the cumbersome process of amending the Constitution.

They were both able to circumvent a Supreme

Court decision merely by statutory means.
Withdrawing Jurisdiction
Article III of the Constitution asserts that "the
supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both
as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under
such Regulations as the Congress shall make" (U.S. Constitution, art. 3, sec. 2).

It is the Exceptions Clause

that gives Congress the "plenary" power over the Court's
appellate jurisdiction (Fisher, 1990, p. 543).
However, it must be noted, as stipulated by Louis
Fisher, that this power is not absolute (p. 543).

In-

deed, "the Exceptions Clause must be read in concert
with other provisions in the Constitution" (p. 543).
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Certainly, "the mere existence of a power does not mean
that it may be used without limit" (p. 546).

When

Congress constructs exceptions to the Court's jurisdiction, it must give "due regard to all provisions
of the Constitution"--an independent judiciary, the
Supremacy Clause, and the constitutional rights available
to citizens (pp. 545-546).

While the Constitution "may

give [Congress the power to] withhold or restrict such
jurisdiction at its discretion, [it may only do so]
provided it be not extended beyond the boundaries fixed
by the Constitution" (p. 545).
The most infamous, and the only successful, case
that involves the Congress tampering with the Supreme
Court's jurisdiction is the Ex parte Mccardle case
(1869).

The case falls during the aftermath of the

Civil War.

Fearing that the Supreme Court might become

involved in deciding the constitutionality of post-Civil
War Reconstruction legislation, Congress, in 1868, decided to repeal an 1867 act which granted to the Supreme
Court the jurisdiction to hear appeals from circuit
courts on matters of habeas corpus (p. 544).

Although

the Court was already in the midst of deciding a case
(William Mccardle) on habeas corpus grounds, it yielded
to Congress' new act.

In its opinion, written by Chief

Justice Chase, the Court stated that it was,
not at liberty to inquire into the motives
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of the legislature. We can only examine
into its power under the Constitution; and
the power to make exceptions to the appellate
jurisdiction of this court is given by express
words (pp. 544-545).
The Supreme Court, in effect, dismissed the case on
grounds that it no longer had jurisdiction over the
matter (p. 545).
Indeed, the Ex parte Mccardle case serves as the
only example in American history in which Congress was
successful at limiting the Court's jurisdiction.

There

have been other attempts, but they have failed largely
because of the controversy over whether or not it is
actually constitutional for Congress to restrict the
Court's jurisdiction (Barnum, 1993, p. 211).

As David

Barnum asserts,
The issue is not whether Congress possesses
the basis power to make exceptions to the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court,
but whether there are any limits on that
power, and if so, what are they (p. 211).
In 1981 and 1982, nearly 30 bills were introduced to
curtail the federal court system of appellate jurisdiction;
212).

none of them were successfully passed (p.

In 1990, Congress (Senate) attempted to limit

the Court's jurisdiction over flag desecration cases;
it, likewise, failed--90 to 10 (Baum, 1992, p. 234).
Conclusion:

Formal Restraints

The Constitution of the United States provides
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for a system of checks and balances between the three
branches of government.

Each branch--Congress, presi-

dent, Supreme Court--possesses a wide array of powers
that it can use to "check" or "curb" the power of the
other two branches of government.

Here, the concern

is over whether or not the Supreme Court and its power
of judicial review are adequately "checked" by the
presidency and Congress.

Certainly, the Constitution

"formally" gives to the president and to Congress numerous powers they both can use to "check" the Supreme
Court.

But the question remains, just how successful

are they both at implementing those powers against the
Court?
We might begin by saying that the conclusions are
mixed.

Certainly, whenever the Congress and the presi-

dent have been successful in implementing their power,
they have both been able to restrain the Court.

Congress

was successful when it was able to overturn the Supreme
Court's constitutional decisions by passing the Eleventh,
Fourteenth, Sixteenth, and Twenty-sixth Amendments.
It was, likewise, successful in restricting the Court's
appellate jurisdiction in the Ex parte Mccardle case
(1869).

President Ulysses Grant was successful in

getting the Legal Tender Cases through the Supreme Court
when Congress authorized that he could appoint an extra
justice to the Court--raising it up to nine (Fisher,
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1990, p. 540).

President Franklin Roosevelt, too, was

successful when he was able to recompose the Court (following several retirements after 1937) with new justices
who were more favorable to his New Deal policies.
As these examples suggest, there have been successful attempts to restrain or influence the Supreme
Court's power.

But as history also suggests, the failed

attempts to do so have far out numbered the successful
ones.

Congress and the president both possess an array

of constitutional measures they can use to restrain,
reverse, or influence the Supreme Court (Barnum, 1993,
p. 214).

Nevertheless, as David Barnum asserts, "what

is perhaps as remarkable as the number and diversity
of these options, is the infrequency with which they
have been used successfully" (p. 214).

CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION:

THE SUPREME COURT IN PERSPECTIVE
Introduction

Since Marbury vs. Madison, the Supreme Court has
exercised the role as "guardian" to the American
Constitution.

Holding that the other institutions of

government--Congress, presidency, states--are accountable
to the Constitution, the Supreme Court has insured that
Constitution has remained "the supreme Law of the Land"
(U.S. Constitution, art. 6).

As Chief Justice John

Marshall reiterates,
If, then, the courts are to regard the constitution, and the constitution is superior to
any ordinary act of the legislature, the constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern
the case to which they both apply (Fisher,
1990, p. 65).

Indeed, it is this principle that has guided the Supreme
Court in its numerous deliberations on constitutional
issues.

Through its use of judicial review, the Supreme

Court has insured that the supremacy of the Constitution
is upheld and that all "law[s] repugnant to [it are]
void" (p. 66).
Since Marbury vs. Madison, the Supreme Court has,
likewise, been the focus of a great deal of political
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controversy in American politics.

Much of this contro-

versy has focused primarily on the fact that justices
of the Court are not directly accountable to the American
people.

They are nominated by the president, confirmed

by the Senate, and seated on the Court for what amounts,
in most cases, as life tenure.

They appear as if they

are, in effect, isolated to political accountability.
Yet, at the same time, they hold enormous power within
America's democratic framework of government.

Together,

these justices serve as "guardian" and "protector" of
the American Constitution.

Necessarily, any law they

find repugnant to the American Constitution is unconstitutional, even though that law was passed by a majority
of the people's representatives--representatives that
were, for all intents and purposes, directly elected
by the people.
Given this, how can we justify the Supreme Court's
role within American government?

How is it that a non-

elected body of jurists holds democratically elected
institutions of government accountable?

Have we evolved

into what Raoul Berger refers to as a "government by
judiciary"?

Are there no restraints on the power of

the Court?
These are questions that have been asked and, for
the most part, answered throughout the course of this
thesis.

The purpose here is not to rehash them over
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again but to put them into some kind of an understandable
perspective--one that justifies the existence of the
Supreme Court and its use of a judicial review power.
The two fundamental arguments I raise in support
of the Supreme Court and a judicial review power are:
1.

The United States cannot be considered a pure

majoritarian democracy;
democracy.

rather, it is a constitutional

A constitutional democracy implies limits

on the powers of government.

It, likewise, provides

for the protection of the rights of the individual--the
minority against the tyranny of the majority.

This

clearly leaves the Supreme Court a role as "protector"
of the countermajoritarian provisions of the Constitution.
2.

The United States cannot be accurately charac-

terized as a "government by judiciary."

Indeed, there

are numerous means, both within the Constitution

and

outside of it, by which the Court's power can be influenced or restrained.
Constitutional Democracy
To argue that the United States is a pristine
example of a majoritarian democracy would be to argue
in error.

Indeed, the United States is a democracy,

but it is not one based on pure majoritarian principles
(Barnum, 1993, p. 258).

Instead, it is a democracy
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that is based upon the premise that absolute power
corrupts.

Certainly, the framers to the Constitution

understood the necessity of majority rule;

they, like-

wise, understood the tyranny that could evolve from
it.

As such, the democracy they envisioned would be

one that balanced majority rule with minority rights
(p. 258).

Moreover, their democracy would seek to limit

government power and, at the same time, to protect the
individual's rights (p. 258).

In that respect, it might

be more plausible to refer to American government not
as a majoritarian democracy, in its purest sense, but
as a constitutional democracy--a democracy with limitations.
The United States government is based upon and
is limited by a Constitution.

It is a Constitution

which creates a working framework of government, provides
it with powers as well as limits, and embodies a series
of individual protections.

Indeed, it is a Constitution

which adheres to both principles of majoritarianism
and countermajoritarianism (p. 254).

Since Marbury

vs. Madison (1803), it has been the duty of the Supreme
Court to uphold the supremacy of the Constitution.
The Supreme Court, through its use of judicial review,
has held primary responsibility for holding government
in conformity to the language found within the Constitution (p. 259).

As Chief Justice Marshall wrote in

89
Marbury vs. Madison, "it is emphatically the province
and duty of the judicial department to say what the
law is" (Fisher, 1990, p. 65).

Clearly, if any law

is in clear conflict with the Constitution, it is "the
province and duty" of the Supreme Court to declare it
void (p. 65).
Given this, if we are to accept that the United
States is premised upon limited government and limited
democracy, it is only reasonable we conclude that the
Supreme Court must possess some inherent right to a
judicial reviewing power.

A constitution implies limits

and those limits, accordingly, "can only be preserved
through the medium of judicial review" (Agresto, 1984,
p. 65).

As Alexander Hamilton argued in Federalist

No. 78, "all the reservations of particular rights or
privileges would amount to nothing" without judicial
review (Fisher, 1990, p. 59).
Restraints or Influences on the Supreme Court
Certainly, there are numerous means, within the
Constitution and outside of it, by which the Supreme
Court's power can be either restrained or influenced.
Some of these means are more informal in nature--political and public reaction to Court decisions--while others
are more formal--appointment of new justices to the
Court, amending the Constitution to override Court
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constitutional rulings, and withdrawal of Court appellate
jurisdiction.

Each one of these restraints or influences

can serve as a formidable Court-curbing measure when
successfully implemented.

However, as already acknowl-

edged, on historical analysis, the success in using
any of these "tools" to restrain or influence the Court
has been mixed.
We are quite certain that the Supreme Court is
influenced by both political and public reaction to
its decisions;

however, to what extent, we are unsure.

As Lawrence Baum argues,
[The Supreme Court does] enjoy greater freedom
from environmental pressures than do most
other policy makers. But by no means is
[it] completely insulated from the outside
world (Baum, 1992, pp. 135-136).
The Supreme Court does not operate inside of a political
vacuum.

Certainly, it is susceptible to both political

and public criticism of its decisions.

The problem

arises, however, as Baum asserts, in the fact that these
"instances are difficult to pinpoint" (p. 136).
Probably, the most effective tool used to influence
the Court, we can argue, is the appointment process.
Anytime a president can appoint a new justice to the
Supreme Court, it is an opportunity for him to influence
the internal make-up of the Court.

As David Barnum

stipulates,
Overall, presidents have been successful
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about 75 percent of the time in selecting
justices who continue, during their tenure
on the Court, to reflect the president's
views (Barnum, 1993, p. 244).
With respect to the use of the appointment process as
a means to retain majoritarian control over the Supreme
Court, David Barnum cites Robert Dahl,
National politics in the United States is
dominated by relatively cohesive alliances
that endure for long periods of time. Except
for short-lived transitional periods when
the old alliance is disintegrating and [a]
new one is struggling to take control of
political institutions, the Supreme Court
is inevitably a part of the dominant national
alliance. As an element in the political
leadership of the dominant alliance, the
Court of course supports the major policies
of the alliance (p. 308).
As such, while the appointment process might be "tortuous
and indirect," it does "constitute a discernible mechanism by which the [people] can influence the course
of Supreme Court decision making" (p. 308).
With respect to the actual restraints on the power
of the Court, we can truthfully argue that the failures
do far outweigh the successes.

Congress has only four

times overridden Supreme Court constitutional decisions
by means of the amendment process.

It has, likewise,

only been successful once in withdrawing the Court's
appellate jurisdiction to hear particular cases.

What

explains this lack of success on the part of Congress
to challenge the Supreme Court's power?

David Barnum

believes that the problem can be explained in three
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ways:
1.

Congress faces a genuine dilemma in trying

to decide which mechanism to use to challenge the Court.
2.

The distribution of political and ideological

forces in American politics.
3.

There is a discrepancy between the values

of ordinary citizens and those held by particular subgroups in the population (pp. 306-307).
While David Barnum does acknowledge that the success
of Congress "in challenging the Supreme Court is
[clearly] open to different interpretations," he is
still disposed to conclude that,
Apart from isolated instances, Congress
has not successfully invoked any of the
various weapons at its disposal for imposing
external restraints on the Court (p. 307).
Observations
From this, can we successfully argue that we have
evolved into a government by judiciary?

We must remember

that while the Supreme Court, on its surface, appears
to be an institution that is politically isolated, it
is not.

It must depend for the enforcement of its deci-

sions upon the consent and cooperation of the other
institutions of government--most notably, the president
and Congress.
No. 78,

As Alexander Hamilton wrote in Federalist
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The Judiciary has no influence over either
the sword or the purse; no direction either
of the strength or of the wealth of the society; and can take no active resolution
whatever. It may truly be said to have neither
FORCE NOR WILL, but merely judgment; and
must ultimately depend upon the aid of the
executive arm even for the efficacy of its
judgments (Fisher, 1990, p. 59).
As such, institutionally, without the support of the
president or Congress, the Supreme Court could truly
be said to be the "least dangerous branch" of government.
Moreover, the Supreme Court must ultimately depend
for the enforcement of its decisions upon the consent
and cooperation of the governed--the people.

As Presi-

dent Abraham Lincoln once said, we are a government
"of the people, by the people, and for the people"
(Garraty, 1989, p. 71).

Without the support of the

people, the Supreme Court would not only be the "least
dangerous branch" of government, it could not fundamentally survive.
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